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So im new and need guidance. I want to have all the vey most protection I can on my device and need to learn how to properly operate it ad well. Thank your for your time and effort you put into this it is very well appreciated!

Is there any documented way our I.T department can disable the ability to connect to or even see the Firefox VPN that is being rolled out via group policy or another settings method? Firefox is a great asset for our agency but we cannot have users having the ability to bypass our web filtering. If there's not an option currently, could we have the IP's or the servers that it runs off of so we can manually block it in our firewall?

I am trying to make the internet experience for myself and my family as safe as possible. Transparency is part of this, so I want to know how to disable private browsing in a way my kids won't be able to turn back on again. Also, are there 'safe search'-like settings in Firefox? I haven't been able to find anything like it yet.

In the Settings, the "HTTPS-Only" feature seems broken. There is an option to 'Don't enable" this feature, but that doesn't make any difference. I can get to an "http:" site using any other browser, but not with the latest Firefox.

I publish NinePane Connector at https://ninepane.com. On September 12, 2026, a Firefox test on Windows displayed NinePane-Connector-Setup-0.8.56-Windows-x64.exe as not commonly downloaded, with Remove file and Allow download controls. I have two matching Firefox screenshots of the warning.

The intended release candidate is distributed through our private authenticated test route. These screenshots do not establish the exact final download URL or completed bytes. The exact Firefox version and capture-time Windows build were not recorded, so I have not guessed them in this form.

The intended local candidate was independently checked as validly Authenticode signed by NINEPANE STUDIO with a timestamp. That identifies the signed local file; it is not proof of safety or of the blocked browser copy's exact bytes. We are not asserting malware detection or requesting a way to bypass the warning.

Which official publisher-support or assessment route applies to Firefox's uncommon-executable warning? Is there a supported way to obtain classification or remediation guidance without publishing a private installer or sharing login credentials? We have already reported the related Chrome warning to Google; should a publisher take any separate Firefox-specific action?

No installer, credentials, session data or unrelated browser diagnostics are included.

chrome logs onto my email without me entering password, and facebook under firefox stays logged in even when i log out with no password. i neeed help forget the vfb but my [redacted] @gmail.com email is dangerously in jeprody

I used Private Browsing to review a web site, and saved a couple of files to my hard drive. When I closed the Private window and went to a different page in Firefox, then used Print and "Microsoft Print to PDF", the print dialog came up with the Private window's last save location as my initial save location. It doesn't matter whether the regular Firefox window was open before or after the Private window was closed.

This was a leak from Private to Regular. Windows 11. Firefox 155.0.1 (64-bit)

I am looking for an addon which displays times in different locations. I find one, FoxClock, which initially seems to meet my need. However, although the developer says its safe, and it has a Recommended badge, text in the app description says "Access your data for all websites." This may be 'honest' but it seems to be honest at the level of a thief saying "I'm going to rob you." WHY would a clock app need access to my data for all websites? Why would a clock app displaying on my desktop, not my browser, need to access any info about my data for any website? Poor coding? Lazy coding? Dangerous coding? Is this only a result of less than nuanced messaging by the developer or Mozilla, by using a generic message, rather than one which accurately states the 'access' is only for specified installation needs? Or another understandable safe reason? I'd like an explanation, since it does call into question the degree of security offered by Mozilla.

Someone claiming to be with Microsoft froze my computer until I answered whether I wanted them to know where I am at. I need protection from hackers like this. I want to be able to do a full scan on my computer.

Firefox security features warning on Linux doesn't explain what kind of file to add to apparmor.d/firefox-local. Is it a .txt file, or something else?

I've noticed that Mozilla products (firefox, thunderbird etc) all phone home all the time, which is a violation of both my security as well as privacy policy. In the firewall one can observe persistent, periodic, repeated connections to various non-sanctioned sites and services, apparently run by Mozilla. These include, but are not limited to:

• .mozgcp.net
• .services.mozilla.net

firefox-portal-detection.com etc.

Specifically, there are persistent, periodic and repeated connection attempts to (just copy/pasting from the first page of firewall report; there are many more as well as similar connection attempts from thunderbird as well): firefox-settings-attachments.cdn.mozilla.net:443 assets-prod.sumo.prod.webservices.mozgcp.net:443 content-signature-2.cdn.mozilla.net:443 push.services.mozilla.com:443 etc

These begin at the startup of the browser/mua and continue throughout the session. Given that none of the sites actually browsed have anything to do with mozilla per se, and given that various privacy-violating features such as DNS-over-HTTPS (yes, that's a not a privacy-enhancing feature but the opposite - it just shifts the surveillance point from the ISP to the DoH provider) and other similar "features" are disabled in-browser, there should be no user/browser connections attempted to mozilla servers.

Also, by setting up a local security MITM proxy in order to observe and analyze the content sent to and received from these services and configuring the browser to connect via the proxy, the browser seems to *stop* trying to connect to these services, which indicates *active* measures by the browser/mua to avoid it's browser-fingerprinting and location-revealing content from being intercepted and analyzed.

This is especially concerning as Mozilla actively brands and markets it's products as privacy-respecting, as for-user-rights and as away-from-big-tech-dominated. Consequently I perceive this as complete breach of trust. Even by just *attempting* such phone-home connections a leak of metadata occurs, identifying the IP, the browser and consequently the user and user's location, sometimes actively (such as was the case with now apparently discontinued location.services.mozilla.net). Combined with whatever content these connections carry, this constitutes a serious breach. And there seems to be no way for the user to configure the browser to stop making these connections, other than by using an external application firewall.

And to top it off, with Firefox version 155.0.1, the browser now outright refuses to connect to *any* sites at all if firefox.settings.services.mozilla.com:443, firefox-settings-attachments.cdn.mozilla.net:443, firefox-portal-detection.com:80 and content-signature-2.cdn.mozilla.net:443 are *externally* blocked, at least on that profile (which worked just fine prior to upgrade to 155.0.1), showing a spinner and waiting indefinitely (not even timing out). These are the *only* connections it even attempts, completely ignoring the actual site that it was told to connect to. So that's at least 4 privacy-violating, security-policy-violating phoning-home connection attempts and a complete disregard for user's actual, sanctioned connection request.